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I find that I have difficulty in commenting on Professor Mashaw's paper.'
The difficulty stems, at least in part, from my uncertainty about what the
paper, in its totality, should be understood to say. Mashaw states that the
purpose of the paper is to examine the rationale for the official-immunity
doctrine; 2 and the paper does indeed hold up for our examination the several
rationalizations for that doctrine that have been offered from time to time by
various courts and commentators.' With appropriate tentativeness Professor
Mashaw offers several quite imaginative, additional rationalizations which-so
far as I am aware-are original with him. 4 But nowhere does the paper indicate whether the author finds these rationalizations persuasive.
Perhaps Professor Mashaw's caution merely reflects the fact that he remains uncertain whether the rationalizations are persuasive. This hypothesis
about the author's ultimate state of mind seems quite plausible to me because
I too find myself quite uncertain whether the rationalizations are persuasive.
I
CRITERIA FOR RULES OF IMMUNITY

While the author has my sympathy on that score, I find it rather more
troublesome that the paper does not explicitly address itself at any point to
the criteria which would enable one to judge whether the rationalizations were
persuasive. I expect that in different intellectual forums, after appropriate
debate, quite different criteria of persuasiveness would be agreed to. In this
particular forum, I propose, the ultimate criterion should be maximization of
a social-welfare function which has as its arguments (1) the magnitude of
harm done to private parties by official transgressions, negatively signed; (2)
the costs of enforcing sanctions that deter harm to private parties, negatively
signed; and (3) some measure of the effectiveness of the government program
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in the context of which the transgressions occur, positively signed.
The first two arguments of the welfare function are by no means easy to
deal with, although they are perhaps no more difficult to deal with in the
present context than in a wide variety of other legal contexts where they
would be encountered-for example, in the context of the personal liability of
corporate employees for transgressions committed in their employment. But it
is the third argument in the welfare function, I believe, which constitutes the
insurmountable barrier to a satisfactory analysis of the problem that has been
set for us in this symposium.
To put the matter more concretely, and perhaps more simply, I think we
should be asking three questions: (1) whether the official-immunity doctrine
increases or decreases the harm caused to private parties by official transgressions; (2) whether it increases or decreases the social cost of reducing harmful
transgressions with other sanctions; and (3) whether it increases or decreases
the effective implementation of the government programs with which the
transgressions are associated. If it decreases the first two and increases the
third, most of us, I assume, would pronounce the immunity doctrine a good
thing. If it increases the first two and decreases the third, most of us, conversely, would pronounce it a bad thing. If the changes which the immunity
doctrine induces in these three variables conform to neither of these simple
patterns, normative evaluation of the immunity doctrine becomes more complex: we would then have go on to inquire how much each of the individual
arguments was altered; and further, we would have to agree on some unit in
which to weigh tradeoffs between, for example, increases in the harm to
private parties and increases in the effectiveness of the associated programs.
For me, as soon as the problem is seen in this light, its wholly unmanageable complexity becomes apparent. I recur to the fact that I said a moment
ago that "most" of us would pronounce the immunity doctrine desirable if it
moved all three of the variables in the direction which was prima facie desirable. Why would not all of us do so? Not all of us would, I suspect, because,
with respect to any particular government program, not all of us would accept
the premise that effective implementation was desirable. I, for example,
would be willing to tolerate at least a slight increase in harm to private parties
for the sake of less effective implementation of Interstate Commerce Commission motor-carrier regulation. 5 Hence, I see the difficulty of evaluating
government programs as one insurmountable barrier to an intellectually
satisfying analysis of the sovereign-immunity doctrine. And, of course, the
difficulty need not be as stark as in the instance I have picked: the difficulty
would arise even if we could all agree that, on balance, the government program was useful rather than absolutely harmful; for even so, we would be
5. See generally A.
163-66 (1969).
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hard put to reach agreement on how much we were willing to pay in terms of
harm to private parties in exchange for a given improvement in implementation.
II
THE PRIVATE-SECTOR ANALOGY

I think that some additional light can be thrown on the intractability of the
official-immunity question by abandoning it for a moment and posing an
analogous question set in the context of the private sector. Let us suppose that
by some judicial quirk we were confronted with a rule which conferred immunity from civil liability on employees of industrial corporations with assets
in excess of $10 million. The question here, as in the actual public-sector case,
would be: Is such immunity a good thing? At first glance it might seem that
the appropriate avenue of analysis, if not the right answer, was clear in the
private sector. We would start down that apparently appropriate avenue of
analysis by observing that not all the social costs of the activities of the firms
in question were brought home to the decisionmakers. Some of the costs
would be left external to the firms. And we might move on to the tentative
conclusion that too many resources were being devoted to the activity in question, and so forth, along familiar lines.
And yet a moment's further thought would show that we had gone too far
too fast. The fact that the costs of harm to outsiders are not being transferred
to employees of a firm does not mean that those costs are not being transferred to the firm itself. The rule of employee immunity which I hypothesized
said nothing at all about the civil liability of the corporation. If the firm were
subject to an appropriate rule of civil liability, then the managers of the firm
would have appropriate incentives to take intracorporate measures to
minimize the costs imposed upon the firm as a consequence of harm to outsiders. Indeed, those measures might go beyond the merely intracorporate
and include suits by the firm against employees for indemnification, on the
ground that their transgressions constituted breaches of their employment
contracts. And even the purely intracorporate measures might be structured
to have much the same financial impact on employees as suits by third parties
would have had, had they been permitted.
In short, even in the context of the private sector, where clearer avenues
of analysis are opened by assumptions about profit maximization and freemarket evaluation of output, we would be unable to say anything useful about
a rule of employee immunity unless we were to conduct a simultaneous inquiry into the rules of enterprise liability.
And I suggest, by this analogy, that the same is true in the context of the
public sector. Only the conjunction of official immunity with sovereign immunity can lead us to any confident conclusion about the social desirability of
the official-immunity rule; and this would be true even if we were able to deal
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more confidently than in fact we can with the social value of the various outputs of governmental enterprises.
In order to make a minor degree of progress with the analogy before us, I
make some very heroic assumptions: (1) All government programs are, at
least on balance, marginally desirable; (2) the incentives of government managers induce them to minimize the costs of rendering a service and to expand
or contract their output until the marginal costs of services are roughly commensurate with their marginal utility to taxpayers; (3) notwithstanding the
continued vitality in some contexts of the historical doctrine of sovereign immunity, the waivers of that doctrine contained in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 6 the Court of Claims Act, 7 and various other specific statutes have in
their totality the consequence that the government enterprise as a whole is
subject to civil liability in the overwhelming preponderance, if not in all, of
the appropriate contexts.
If these assumptions are indulged, heroic though they are, the problem
of official immunity becomes roughly analogous to the hypothetical conditions of employee immunity which I posited earlier. This laborious process
of converting an intractable problem into a merely hypothetical problem may
hardly seem worthwhile. Yet I suggest that it may take us a bit further with
the analysis of the former problem.
It is my general impression that the industrial and legal contexts in which
the private sector functions resemble closely my hypothetical rules of employee
immunity coupled with enterprise liability. When third parties are damaged by
employee transgressions, both the employee and the corporate employer are
available as defendants unless the employee was acting outside the scope of his
employment. 8 If the employee was acting out of personal malice, that circumstance alone will often, although not always, take his conduct outside the scope
of his employment, in which case only the employee is liable. 9 If both employee
and corporate employer are available as defendants, the third party will almost
invariably sue the corporate employer and will not sue the employee. Even
when recovery is won from the corporate employer, the employer will only on
the most extraordinary occasions resort to judicial proceedings against the
employee for indemnification. Indeed, the express or implied terms of
employment contracts far more often call for employer indemnification of
employees, should they be held liable individually. Whatever other sanctions
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the employer may invoke are imposed through intracorporate means, such as
discharge, reassignment, censure, or reduction in pay.
This pattern is not dissimilar to the pattern we see in government. With
crude generality one can say of both sectors that the employee, and only the
employee, is liable when the transgression is a product of his personal malice
rather than an attempt to implement the policies of the employer; and in
other cases the employer, and only the employer, is in fact held liable. In both
sectors the employer currently has rights of indemnification against the
employee and could, by contract, expand his rights of indemnification to embrace a large fraction of all the imaginable instances of vicarious employer
liability; yet in neither sector do we find employers resorting to judicial damage claims to enforce even existing rights of indemnification; and we observe
no general pattern of contractual expansion of the right to indemnification.
To me this pattern suggests quite strongly that managers in bureaucratic
contexts, be they public or private, do not find it cost-effective to impose
pecuniary responsibility for harm to third parties on individual employees.
And it is not difficult to formulate intuitively appealing explanations of why
that is so: Pecuniary responsibility on the part of employees leads to internal
inefficiency, not because employee behavior is unresponsive to the prospect
of such liability but because it is too responsive. Liability induces the employee
to adopt behavior that is suboptimal from the standpoint of the employer.
Pecuniary responsibility forces employees to choose between protecting their
own purses and executing the programs of their employers with zeal and imagination. We should not be surprised to find that employees who face such a
choice strike a different balance than would those who had to bear both the
costs of harm to outsiders and the costs of ineffective implementation, and
who, therefore, had an incentive to equalize the two types of cost at the margin.
III
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Let me now turn from my emphasis upon the similarities between the
private and public sectors and attempt to identify some critical differences.
One of the most intriguing differences is the immunity from suit conferred,
not upon government employees, but upon the government as employer
by the so-called discretionary exception" in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
To highlight the difference I have in mind, let me posit two cases. In
the first, Lockheed decides to build a small, relatively low-cost propjet aircraft, which it intends to sell to other corporations for business travel. In the
course of engineering design the question arises whether the plane should be
equipped with de-icing apparatus. After well-documented internal delibera10.
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tions a decision is reached, because of fuel and construction costs, not to install de-icers. Subsequently, when the plane is being flight-tested in southern
California, extraordinary and unforseeable high-altitude weather conditions
cause ice to form; the plane crashes into a residential area, killing a number
of people and doing extensive property damage. In the second case the facts
are the same except that the plane is a military plane, all design decisions are
made in the Pentagon, and the ultimate decision not to install the de-icer is
made by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force on the ground that the extra
weight will reduce the plane's range and impair its military-reconnaissance
effectiveness.
In the forseeable civil suits charging the plane's designers with negligence,
judgment against Lockheed is a probable outcome in the first case, whereas
judgment against the Government would almost certainly be precluded on the
ground that the design decision was a discretionary act under the terms of the
Tort Claims Act.
In the private suits the court would review and, in substance, second-guess
the wisdom of the decision to omit the de-icer. Testimony about the cost and
weight of de-icers and about the impact of that weight on fuel consumption
would be admissible, and probably critical. It is clear that a judicial tribunal is
not well suited to making engineering-economic decisions of this kind. And
yet the private controversy would come to the court with that decision as its
root. One can imagine that some courts, at some times and places, might try
to compensate for their perceived institutional inappropriateness by subjecting
the design decision to a test of reasonableness, or even to a test of good faith;
but to a greater or lesser degree the courts would have to second-guess the
decision.
The exception for discretionary acts in the Federal Tort Claims Act constitutes recognition of the inappropriateness of judicial tribunals as secondguessers of policy decisions for which primary responsibility has been lodged
elsewhere in government, presumably in more competent hands. At bottom
the difference between the scope of private-enterprise liability and governmententerprise liability to which the exception gives rise reflects a judgment that
some neutral-that is, governmental-tribunal must second-guess Lockheed's
decision but not the Government's, because Lockheed cannot be relied upon
to take into account adequately the interests of potential third-party victims
whereas government decisionmakers can be relied upon to do so, at least to a
greater extent-to an extent sufficient to tip the balance against secondguessing by an institutionally unsuited judiciary.
In the case I have posited one might question the desirability of the exception for discretionary acts, pursuing the usual lines of argument about the
desirability of internalizing all social costs. But I selected this case because I
wanted to be able to frame a very close private analogy, not because the case
illustrates persuasively the propriety of the discretionary exception. As one
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moves farther and farther away from quasi-proprietary activities, like designing aircraft, toward purely governmental rulemaking and legislation, the
argument against judicial second-guessing of considered policy decisions
made in other parts of government becomes stronger. It becomes, in the context of government-enterprise liability, closely analogous to what Professor
Mashaw refers to as the cause-of-action problem in the context of the officialimmunity doctrine.11 At some point along that spectrum, I suppose all of us
would agree, judicially administered damage remedies cease to be appropriate,
because they constitute a transfer to the judiciary of choices we think inappropriate to the judiciary. And if those choices are inappropriate to the judiciary
at the enterprise-liability level, then they are inappropriate at the officialliability level as well.
In my opinion, a major weakness in Professor Mashaw's paper is that he
assumes the desirability of, and suggests methods for, expanding the
judiciary's role in second-guessing government policy decisions without analyzing critically when it is inappropriate to make the judiciary, rather than another branch of government, the locus of decisionmaking.
The final difference I wish to note between private enterprises and governmental enterprises is the following: Apart from the desirability of compensating injured victims-an important theme in tort liability but one which Professor Mashaw sets aside in the opening paragraphs of his paper 2 and which
I, too, therefore leave to one side-the reason for imposing liability on private
enterprise for harm to third parties is that a firm is better able than its victims
to minimize the sum of production costs and the costs of such harm. If a firm
bears the costs of harm to third parties, the firm will find it profit-maximizing
to reduce the magnitude of harm by changing its inputs, internal processes,
or both to the extent that it can do so at a cost less than the reduction in
harm. And to the extent that such adaptations are not possible the costs of
remaining harms, if imposed on the firm, will be reflected in the price of its
outputs, causing a reduction in output, perhaps to zero. This socially optimal reduction in output, which occurs without regard to whether adaptation is cheap or infinitely costly, occurs because the firm faces a demand
curve which is, to some degree, elastic.
When one turns to the question of government-enterprise liability, one
must recognize that there is far less assurance that either intra-enterprise
adaptation or output reduction will occur: in many instances output price is
zero; in others price will bear no specific relationship to cost; incentives for
cost minimization appear to be weak; and empire-building may constitute the
dominant institutional motivation.
Nevertheless, Professor Mashaw's suggestion that something might be
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gained from imposing enterprise liability, not on the United States Treasury
in general, but on individual agency budgets is ingenious and deserves a good
deal more thought. It is at least conceivable that cost sensitivity would be enhanced by a system of liability along those lines; and if that is true, the social
utility of imposing liability would be enhanced.
But with only such minor qualifications as may be appropriate in view of
this last point, realism requires that damage remedies against the government
enterprise be viewed primarily as compensation mechanisms rather than behavior modifiers. Hence Mashaw's decision to ignore compensation in this
context seems to me to ignore the most pertinent consideration. And to the
limited extent that behavior modification is a realistic possibility one can say
little that is useful about official liability unless it is viewed in the immediate
context of enterprise liability. Viewed outside that context, official liability
is analogous to one-handed clapping.

